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LEARNING TO AGREE '5!
Jonathan A. K. Cave, Lecturer, Department of
Economics
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Summary;
In this note, we generalize some of the results pertaining to the phenomenon
of common knowledge. An event is common knowledge if each agent knows it, each
knows that the others know it, etc. We define a class of procedures whereby
agents take actions based on private information, and make further inferences
from their observations of the actions of other agents. We are able to characterize
the information thus revealed and obtain general versions of theorems to the effect
that agents cannot agree to disagree, and will not make trades based solely on
differences in information.

Learning to Agree
I. Introduction
In this paper we explore some of the inplicatiocs of the idea of
"common knowledge" and define a general model whereby agents can make
inferences about the knowledge held by other agents on the basis of
actions those agents are publicly observed to take. The intuitive data
of common knowledge is that an event is known to all (each agent can
tell whether or not it has occurred) , and each agent knows that every
other agent knows this, each agent knows that every other agent knows
that every other agent knows this, etc. etc. The discussion of the
phenomenon of common knowledge began with the publication by Aumann (Al)
of a resxilt which holds that, if two agents form conditional probability
assessments of the likelihood of a given event, and if these assessments
are common knowledge, then it is not possible for the assessments to differ,
Milgrom (Ml) then gave a formal characterization of common knowledge that
expressed Aumann* s definition in Axiomatic terms, Geanakopolous and
Polemarchakis (G&P) extended the collection of events to which the
appelation "common knowledge" could be applied by defining an explicit
communications mechanism whereby agents exchange conditional probability
assessments about the likelihood of a given event, revise their private
beliefs in the light of these disclosures, and continue until a sort of
steady state is reached at which there is no further revision. Another
sort of communications mechanism was defined by Milgrom and Stokey (M&S)
in the context of a market with uncertainty and risk-averse agents; the
I am indebted to Franco is e Schoumaker and Al Roth for helpful discussions.
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Information exchanged constituted a set of feasible and conditionally
individually rational trades, and the result was the no-trade point;
risk-averse agents V7ill not make trades solely on the basis of differ-
ences in information.
What we shall do in this paper is to present simple definitions of
the idea of common knowledge consistent with a general model of a comr-
munications process. With the aid of this model, we shall be able to
reproduce the existing results and obtain some extensions of them. In
fact, it will turn out that we can characterize any such model in terms
of the common-knowledge partition on the states of nature that charac-
terizes equilibrium. Another advantage is that we shall be able to ex-
tend the notion that agents cannot "agree to disagree" to a more general
context, and relax some of the stringent assumptions necessary for that
result
.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in Section II we record for
posterity in its most general form, the story of the "adulterous couples"
which speakers on the topic are fond of reciting, but which has never
appeared in print, to our knowledge. In Section III we present the
model of information, define the general communication mechanism, and
describe its equilibria. In Section IV we give the main results and
indicate how they relate to the literature. Section V contains some
examples and lists some open problems that are currently being explored,
II. The Adulterous Couples
This is a story whose origins are unclear, but one that clearly
demonstrates the principle of common knowledge. It belongs to a class
of stories usually couched in tenns of people with marks on their fore-
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heads trying to determine something about their own mark, but the pre-
sent version has slightly more intrinsic interest, if not plausibility.
The story goes as follows: in a certain country, the rule is that
any wife who can prove that her husband is committing adultery must brand
him on the forehead with the letter "A". Moreover, it is common know-
ledge that no wife knows whether or not her husband is unfaithful, but
that each wife knows how many of the other husbands are. In other words,
if there are no couples, and k of the husbands are unfaithful, each wife
knows (and is known to know ...) that either k or k-1 of the n-1 other
husbands are cheating. However, since no wife knows the truth about
her own husband, matters continue in this wise without any branding of
husbands. Continue, that is, until a travelling moralist, excessively
concerned with other people's business, happens to visit the country.
Outraged by the immorality he detects, he calls a meeting which is
attended by the wives, at which he announces "there are at least m
unfaithful husbands" (where m
_< k _< n) . As long as m < k, this comes
as no news to anyone, so that everyone believes the moralist, and nothing
much appears to change. Disgruntled, our latter-day Muggeridge leaves
in a huff. For a while nothing happens, and matters go on as usual,
st
However, on the k-m+1— day all the guilty husbands are branded!
We shall illustrate the process of deduction for two cases:
n=k=Tiri-l=2; and n=k=m+2=3, from which it should be clear how one proceeds
in the general case, (The case n=4, m=l is worked out as an application
of our model in Section V below,) It should also be clear from this
exposition that nothing like the entire infinite regress of 'I knows
that II knows that I knows that II knows that .,,' involved in common
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knowledge is required to make this work: I am indebted to Al Roth for
this obseirvation.
In the case n=k=TD+l=2, wife 1 reasons as follows: "I know that
husband 2 is an adulteror, since he is involved with me, but I do not
know whether my own husband is. However, I know that wife 2 does know
this. Therefore, if ny husband is faithful, then wife 2 will conclude
from the moralist's announcement that it is her own husband who is the
cheat. Therefore, if my husband is faithful, husband 2 will be branded
tomorrow." Wife 2 reasons similarly, of course, and so neither husband
gets branded on the first night. However, each wife then learns the
truth from the inaction of the other and on day 2 both husbands come
home to find the iron hot and waiting.
The case n=k=m+2=3 is slightly more complicated. We illustrate
only wife I's chain of reasoning. "If my husband is faithful, then
wife 2 will know this. This means that wife 2 will observe that one
other husband is unfaithful, although she may not know which one. She
will then suppose that, if her husband (husband 2) is faithful, then
one of either wife 3 or myself will observe no adulteries. That one
of us will brand our husband tonight." Each of the other wives reasons
similarly, so there is no branding on the first night. On the second
day, when wife 2 observed that neither husband 1 nor husband 3 has
been branded, then she should go home and brand her own husband,
according to wife I's reasoning . When she does not, and the third day
dawns with no branded husbands, all the chains of reasoning based on
the supposition by wife 1 that her husband is innocent collapse, and
each infers the awful truth.
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Obvlously, what is important in this class of examples is that each
person knows enough about what the other ones know to be able to inter-
pret what they do. This is the inqjortance of common knowledge, and the
reason why it is not enough merely for each person merely to know what
information about the true state the other people know. In other words,
it is necessary that wife 2 knows that wife 3 knows that wife 1 knows
whether 0, 1, or 2 of husbands 2 and 3 is unfaithful, so that wife 1 can
form an accurate appraisal of wife 2*s assessment of wife 3's actions.
In the following section, we present a model wherein these notions can
be given precise definition and their implications explored.
III. The Model
We begin with a measureable space (0,3) where 3 is a a-field of
subsets of fi. This space constitutes the states of nature . For precise
definitions of these and other measvire- theoretic concepts, the reader is
referred to any standard textbook on measure theory, such as Halmos (H)
,
We are also given a finite set N = {l,..,,n} of agents. Each agent i
is endowed with a measiireable partition P on the states of nature, and
with a prior u > which is a probability measure on the space (12,3).
We shall interpret these objects as follows: if the state ueO occurs,
agent i is told only that one of the states in that element of P that
contains lu has occurred, but not which one. We shall denote this
collection of states by P (oo) and refer to it as agent i's private
Information . An event is any member of Be6, and each agent possesses
a prior belief as to the likelihood of this event given by p (B).
After the true state has been chosen, and the agent has received his
private information, he can form a posterior belief as to the likelihood
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of B's occurrence, given by q (B;u)) = !"" '-'"/•' « this is easily seen to
be a simple conditional probability. Before we describe the model any
further, we must define some operations on partitions. In keeping with the
above notation, if R is any partition of £2, and if wefi is any state, we shall
denote by R((») that element of R that contains u. Now suppose that R and S
are two different partitions* We say that R is finer than S (S is coarser
than R) iff every set in S is a union of sets in R. We write this relation
ROS. Given any partition R we define the field generated by R , F(R), to
be the collection of all sets which are unions of sets in R, together with
the empty set. For ftill generality, we note that we can define F(S) for any
collection of sets S by taking the closure of S under coiqilementation and
unions and intersections, together with the empty set. Given any two parti-
tions R and S we define two new partitions
:
i) their meet R/\ S = {Beg: BeF(R) and BeF(S)} - this is the parti-
tion consisting of sets that can be 'detected' using either R or S; the
finest common coarsening of R and S; and
ii) their .join R V S = {Beg: B = B^ ^ ^2* *^^® B^eF(R), B^eFCS)} -
this is the collection of sets that can be detected using both R and S
together; the coarsest common refinement of R and S.
We should note that, as we have defined them, neither the meet nor the
join is really a partition, but is actually the field generated by some
partition. We shall refer to these two objects interchangeably, when no
confusion will result.
Returning now to the general model, we define two partitions that sum-
marize everyone's infoirmation:
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M = A P is the meet , and J = V P Is the join
ieN leN
Clearly, MCJ, M is the set of events that everyone can detect acting
Indepedently > while J is the set of events that can be detected if agents
pool their information. One further assumption that we shall make is
that the join consists of non-null events. In other words, if BeJ,
and B ?4 0, then y (B) > 0, for all i.
We now turn to the definition of common knowledge.
Definition : Let AeB, and coEfi, A is said to be common knowledge at o)
,
if AQM((ij); in other words, if every agent knows whether or not A has
occurred when the true state is w, and every agent knows that every
other agent knows whether A has occurred, ... Implicit in this is the
assumption that the partitions themselves are common knowledge. The
event A is said to be common knowledge iff it is common knowledge at oj
for every oieA; in other words, iff AeF(M),
Remarks ; We shall later be concerned with the difference between an
event which is common knowledge in some states and an event which is
common knowledge. Here we present a simple example. Suppose that there
are two agents and four states of the world, and that the partitions
1 2
are given by: P = (s-s^) (s,s, ) ; P = (s, ) (s-s-) (s , ) . Consider
the event (s-s, ) : if the true state is s,, then both agents will know
that (s-s,) has occurred, but if the true state is s-, only agent 1
will know that (s,s,) has occurred. Another point we should make at this
juncture is that we are also assuming that the priors p are common
knowledge. In most of the work to date, it has been asstxmed both that
they are common knowledge and that they are the same. We shall see to
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what extent the assumption of eqvial priors is necessary in what follows.
Avunann discusses the assumption, and mentions that Harsayi (H2) has
defended it on the grounds that the only reason for agents to form
different priors is that they have been given different information at
some point in the past, and that the supposedly different priors are in
fact different posteriors derived from identical priors. While it is
difficult to fault this argument if we accept a sufficiently broad con-
cept of information, such a notion of information puts a great deal of
strain on the assumption that the partitions are common knowledge.
Therefore, while we shall sometimes use the assunqjtion that agents have
identical priors, some of our results are independent of this assinnption,
and we do not wish to prejudice the issue.
We now define a process by which agents can commimicate with each
other, albeit in what may be a fairly indirect fashion. Let us add to
the structvire above another piece of common knowledge. For each agent
i, we shall define an action rule f : 3-*-Z , where Z is some space
of actions. The procedure we have in mind can be loosely described as
follows: in the beginning, each agent is given some private information
P (oj) about the true state uefl, and takes the appropriate action f (P (to)),
whose value becomes common knowledge, along with the actions of the other
agents. On the next day, each person forms a new assessemnt as to the
true state of the world based on private information and the information
revealed by the other agents. Along with this assessment goes an assess-
ment as to what the other agents beliefs on the second round can be, since
each agent goes through the same process of revision. Thus, on day 2
agent i will have some subset of P (w) which is consistent with private
-9-
Information and public observation. Also, conditional on any state in
this set, i will be able to work out what j believes, what j believes k
believes, and so on. Fortunately, we shall be able to obtain simple
expressions of these statements. On this second day, each agent takes
the action appropriate to its current information, and the process con-
tinues xintil an equilibrixan is reached.
Formally, we wish to concern ourselves with the following objects;
actions f taken by agent i at stage t, and sets of states H (f , ...f.)
consistent with a seqiience of actions. These objects are defined induc-
tively as follows:
fj_(a)) = [f^iu,) f°(a))], where fj(a)) = f^(P^(aj))
^l^^l) = {oj'efi: f^Co)') = f^}
f2((o) = [f\(i^)y...,^(<^)]» where f^((u) = f^Cui) = f^(H^(f^(a))) /I P'^Co)))
H^(f^,...,f^) = {a>'eHj._^(fj._^,...,f^): f^(a)') = f^}
f,.(a)) = [fJCw) f^(oo)], where fj(u)) = f'^(H^_^(') /O P^(aj)), and the
argument of H , has bee suppressed for brevity.
The reader can convince him/herself that what we have described is
just what we said in words above, and that it is indeed the best that
can be done. The events in the sets H are a matter of public record,
and therefore constitute a sort of common knowlege belief about the true
state. To find any agent's private belief about the true state at time
t it suffices to form P (oj) O H . Agent i can do this for itself with
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no trouble, and can therefore take the appropriate action at each stage.
Agent i can also form P-^(a)')n H for all co'eP (uj) D H ; this is the
set of possible t— round beliefs of agent j, according to agent i's
best information. In the same way, we can derive agent i's assessment
of what j thinks that k thinks, and so on. We now define an equilibrium.
Definition ; an inference eguilibriimi consists of an integer T, a sequence
of actions f^,...f„, and a subset H of fi, with the property that
H_, = H (f , ,,,f-) = H . (f - , , . , ,f. ) .
In other words, an inference equilibrium, or IE, is a situation
where no further revision of information takes place. It is immediate
that for all k,H^_^^ = H , and f^j. = f-j,; so that this is truly an
equilibrium. We should also point out that everything in the model is
a deterministic function of the trxie state o), so that we can also define
the inference equilibrium at oj to be just the common-knowledge belief
to which the system converges given that the true state is w. This
belief will be denoted H(a)).
IV. Results
In this section we present several results pertinent to the model
of the previous section.
Theorem I ; (existance) for an oiefi, there exists a unique inference
equilibrum.
Proof: it is trivial to observe that, for any t,H
^^CT^t* ^° that the
map H is a contraction. Since it is also single-valued (as long as the
i V
f are), it must hae a unique fixed point. QED
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Theorem II ; (convergence) for any wefi, if M(a)) /H P is finite for each i,
the inference equilibritnn is achieved in a finite number of steps,
bounded above by
Z #(M(u))nP^)
ieN
Proof: obvious; we merely remark that what we mean by )?(M(aj)/l P ) is the
number of elements of P (not the number of states belonging to these
elements) that belong to M(a)), and that the definition of M(u)) assures
us that any element of P that intersects M((i)) is contained in M(aj)
for each i and la.
Theorem III ; H constitutes a partition of fi.
Proof: suppose to the contrary that there exist distinct states oj and
oj' such that
H(a3) ?f H(a))n H(a)') ^
Now consider as well the sequences f = f^,,.,,f„ and f = fJ,...,f' of
actions that establish these inference equilibria. First, suppose that
f^ jt f » By definition of H- and the fact that f. is the value of f^
on a member of a partition, we can see that f^ j^ fJ iiq)lies
IL (f^) r\ H- (f ') = 0, Therefore, we must have f- ~ f
-I
• Now suppose
that we have f^ = f' for all 1 < t < s, but that f j^ f. Therefore,
t t — * s s *
we have Hg-l^^s-l' •*• '^1^ " ^s-l^^s-1' * ••»^P' ^°" ^^^^ agent's
partition P restricts to a partition of H ,, so that f j^ f impliesS^X s s
H (f ,f f )/1 H (f',f ,...,f ) = 0. It will be noted that
we made use of f = f ' in writing this last equation, since it would
not be true otherwise. At any rate, this provides the inductive step
and proves the theorem. QED
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Remark ; this is the most important theorem so far, and justifies the
construction of our general model, since the inference partition H thus
obtained is characteristic of the commimications rule f , and provides
a method by which various structures can be compared as to the degree
to which information gets revealed as well as which agents obtain which
information. It also considerably simplifies the construction and
analysis of examples, which we shall address in the next section. How-
ever, before we proceed to the specific examples, we shall prove some
other properties that are of interest in certain special cases.
Definition ; a collection of action rules f = f^ f^ is symmetric
iff f = f for all i. An action rule is union-consistent if, for any
disjoint sets B,C£g, we have:
f(B) =f(C) implies f(B) = f (B U C) = f(C)
Examples of union consistent rules include: conditional probabilities
for fixed events or collections of events; conditional expectations of
random variables; and actions which maximize conditional expectations of
functions of random variables. In short, these examples cover most of
the concrete applications of communication procedures that have been
proposed to date.
Theorem IV ; (the impossibility of agreeing to disagree) : If f is a
symmetric and union-consistent action rule, and H is the inference
partition corresponding to f , then for every loefi, f (P (a))ll H(a))) =
f (P^ (to) O H(a))). In other words, at an inference equilibrium,
all agents will take exactly the same actions.
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Proof: By definition of an IE, for each ieN, and each lo'eH(co), we must have
f(P^((u) n H(aj)) = f(P^(u)')ri H(u))). If this were not true, then further
inference would be possible. However, by the union condition it follows
that:
f(H(a))) = f(P^(a))n H(aj))
since H(oj) is just the intersection of sets of the form P (o)')/! H(a)),
over oj'eH(aj), all of which lead to the same action. This condition is
independent of i, so the theorem is proven. QED
Another question we might ask is what sort of events are common
knowledge at an inference equilibrium? Now, it is certainly going to
be the case that the inference partition is (weakly) finer than M and
(weakly) coarser than J, but the esact ranking of H will depend on f
.
However, from the definition of common knowledge, we can provide a super-
ficial answer to the above question. At the inference equilibrium, the
information possessed by each agent is represented by P (01)/^ H(a)).
In other words, an agent in a model such as ours can look forward to
having the partition P V H. The events which are common knowledge at
IE are those belonging to the field generated by the meet of these "final"
partitions:
Proposition V ; Aeg is common knowledge at the inference equilibrium
iff AeF(M yH).
Proof: by definition, A is common knowledge iff AeF(/\ (P N/H)) =
. ieN
F((/^P ) v/H) = F(m\/H). QED
ieN
Another question we can ask is whether there is a simple expression for
H in terms of P and f . For example, if f = constant all i, we have H = M,
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while if r (B) = B (or some sufficient statistic), we obtain H = J.
While we have no simple expression, we can observe the following:
H^ = V(f^)"'''(F'-), H, = V'(F^)"-'-(/\/ H ), etc. From this expression,
ieN ieN
we can obtain characterizations of H in various special cases and also
derive some conditions under which we get full revelation: H = J,
However, those are topics for a subsequent paper.
V. Examples
In this section, we list some of the examples that have been used
in the literattire. Perhaps the most important, at least historically,
is the action rule specified by Aumann and G&P:
p(p^((o)nB)
'^^^'
P(P^(.))
where p is the common prior of all the agents. This action rule is
symmetric and union-consistent, so the theorems of those two papers are
special cases of our theorems I, II, and IV above, for the case where
there are only two agents. Another example is that used by Milgrom and
Stokey, where the action TuLe is specified for the whole economy. They
do not actually specify an action rule in terms of what an agent knows,
but one can infer an action rule from their notion of what is common
knowledge at an equilibrium. In essence, they have their agents submit
a vector of net trades that is chosen from a set of feasible n-tuples
of net trades that are individually-rational conditional on each agent's
private information. One can also imagine somewhat more involved formu-
lations of action rules for economic situations; examples have been
described by Aumann (A2) , Jordan (J), Cave (C) and Radner (R) . A common
thread in all of these models is that agents make some trades that maximize
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condltional expected utility based on their private information. The
results of these trades (which may be in the form of clearing prices,
clearing prices and final allocations, etc.) are then made common
knowledge, information is revised and the process repeats. The endpoint
of these adjustment procedures is a situation where no further informa-
tion is conveyed; this means that the final allocation is both ex ante
and ex post efficient; it constitutes a rational expectation equilibrium
relative to the information structure which gives each agent the parti-
tion P V H» Much of the literature on rational expectations, trading
with differential information, etc. can be understood in this context.
One final class of examples is found in the literature on repeated games
of incomplete information, where explicit learning processes are a re-
sult of equilibrium behavior.
We conclude the discvission of examples by working out the tale of
the adulterous couples for the case n=4, m=l, all values of k. In this
case, we can represent the state of nature as w = (h^ jh-.h^jh, ), where
if husband 1 is innocent
1 if husband 1 Is an adulterer
It will be convenient to introduce a more condensed notation for the
states and we shall represent them as the numbers of which the original
states were binary representations, viz;
aj(h^,h2,h2,h^) = 8h^ + Ah^ + 2h2 + h^
The action rule in terms of the original state space is;
.
B (brand) iff h. = 1 for all oieS
f^(S) = ^
N (not brand) otherwise
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In what follows, we shall mark the states where the indicated player is
to take action B with an asterisk. The information structure is as
follows: we indicate the fc— element of agent i's partition by P,
i
^l 4
1 (0,8*) (1.2,4,9*,10*,12*)
2 (0,4*) (1,2,5*,6*,8,12*)
3 (0,2*) (1,3*, 4, 6*, 8,10*)
4 (0,1*) (2, 3*, 4,5*, 8,9*)
4 ^
(3,5,6,11*,13*,14*) (7,15*)
(3, 7*, 9,10, 13*, 14*) (11,15*)
(5, 7*, 9,11*, 12,14*) (13,15*)
(6,7*,10,11*,12,13*) (14,15*)
At the present tine, M = f2 (the coarse partition, and J = [{0},.. .,{15}]
the fine partition, H = M and we are in inference equilibrium. Now
suppose that we add the following piece of common knowledge: the true
state is not (0,0,0,0). The information partitions remain the same,
except that pj = (8) , pj = (4) , PJ = (2) , and P^ = (1) . It is therefore
obvious that if the true state is a menber of {1,2,4,8}, H(u) = {co}, and
convergence is immediate (takes one 'day'). In fact, we have that, for
example, w = 1 implies f^(a)) = N,N,N,B; and H(a)) = H^(N,N,N,B) = {1}.
For any other states, we have f, (to) = N,N,N,N, so that H. (N,N,N,N) =
(3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15). We can show what happens in each of
these states in the following table, where we have shown the true state,
the second-round beliefs of each agent in each state, and the second-
round actions of the agents.
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state 1 P-'-(a)) H^ P^(a)) H^ P^((d) H^ P^(w) H^ f
3 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (3,7,9,10,13,14) (3,6,10)* (3,5,9)* NNB:
5 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (5,6,12)* (5,7,9,11,12,14) (3,5,9)* NBN
6 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (5,6,12)* (3,6,10)* (6,7,10,11,12,13) NBB
7 (7,15) (3,7,9,10,13,14) (5,7,9,11,12,14) (6,7,10,11,12,13) NNN
9 (9,10,12)* (3,7,9,10,13,14) (5,7,9,11,12,14) (3,5,9)* BM
10 (9,10,12)* (3,7,9,10,13,14) (3,6,10)* (6,7,10,11,12,13) BNB
11 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (11,15) (5,7,9,11,12,14) (6,7,10,11,12,13) NNN
12 (9,10,12)* (5,6,12)* (5,7,9,11,12,14) (6,7,10,11,12,13) BBN
13 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (3,7,9,10,13,14) (13,15) (6,7,10,11,12,13) NNN
14 (3,5,6,11,13,14) (3,7,9,10,13,14) (5,7,9,11,12,14) (14,15) ms. {
15 (7,15) (11,15) (13,15) (14,15) NNN
Therefore, the states that get discovered after the second roxmd are
(3,5,6,9,10,12), so for those states to, we have H(tu) = {cu}. For the
others, w^re F- = NNNN, the new common knowledge belief is given by
H2((NNNN),(NNNN)) = (7,11,13,14,15). We can draw the same kind of ;
table to represent the outcomes on the third round for each of these i
states: i
state P"'"(a)) H^ P^(a)) H2 P^(aj) H3 P^(a)) H^ f
7
11
13
14
15
(7,15)
(11,13,14)*
(11,13,14)*
(11,13,14)*
(7,15)
(7,13,14)*
(11.15)
(7,13,14)*
(7,13,14)*
(11.15)
(7,11,14)*
(7,11,14)*
(13,15)
(7,11,14)*
(13,15)
(7,11,13)*
(7.11,13)*
(7,11,13)*
(14,15)
(14,15)
NB6B
BNBB
BBNB
BBBN
NNNN
Thus all the information is revealed after the third round, although it
may take until the fourth day for the parties to take appropriate action
in case the true state were 15. It is therefore obvioxis that H = J =
the fine partition, and that this way of dealing with the adulterous
couples story is much clearer and easier to generalize than the verbal
approach adopted in Section II above.
There remain several open questions in regard to these mechanisms,
in addition to those already raised. For example, if we relax the
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condition of Identical priors, the Aumann/G&P action rule is no longer
symmetric; though it is indeed union-consistent. In that case, one can
easily modify the results of Theorem IV, but much of its intuitive appeal
is lost; it becomes possible for people to agree to disagree. It would
be interesting to investigate the effect of different priors on the
other union^consistent rules mentioned after the definition. Another
line of inquiry is to investigate what the interdependence is between
event A about which the Aumann/G&P agents communicate and the degree of
revelation. In particular, if we allow agents to communicate about some
collection of events, it seems likely that we could improve the perfor-
mance of the mechanism. An obvious example is having agents communicate
their conditional probabilities on all the events in J: this leads to
convergence to H = J in one round. Another question left unanswered is
whether certain classes of events remain in the middle range between
common knowledge at ai, and common knowledge when we move to IE. In
particular, does the G&P rxile imply that we converge to siutations where
the target event becomes common knowledge? The answer is probably no,
but the pursuit may turn up some interesting results. So would the
analysis of strategic behavior in these models.
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